FM Sitharaman announces Rs 30,600 crore govt guarantee for ‘bad bank’
Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman said most of the big-ticket NPAs (Non Performing Assets) will be transferred to NARCL, thereby cleaning up banks’ balance sheets and freeing up growth capital for them to support economic activity
Another entity — India Debt Resolution Company Ltd (IDRCL), which has also been set up — will then try to sell the stressed assets in the market.
The NARCL-IDRCL structure is the new bad bank. To make it work, the government has okayed the use of Rs 30,600 crore to be used as a guarantee.
What is a bad bank? Why was it needed?
In every country, commercial banks accept deposits and extend loans. The deposits are a bank’s “liability” because that is the money it has taken from a common man, and it will have to return that money when the depositor asks for it. Moreover, in the interim, it has to pay the depositor an interest rate on those deposits.
In contrast, the loans that banks give out are their “assets” because this is where the banks earn interest and this is money that the borrower has to return to the bank.
The whole business model is premised on the idea that a bank will earn more money from extending loans to borrowers than what it would have to pay back to the depositors.
Imagine, then, a scenario where a bank finds a huge loan not being repaid because, say, the firm that took the loan has failed in its business and is not a position to pay back either the interest or the principal amount.
Every bank can take a few such knocks. But what if such “bad loans” (or the loans that will not be paid back) rise alarmingly? In such a case, the bank could sink.
Now imagine a scenario where several banks in an economy face high levels of bad loans and all at the same time. That will threaten the stability of the whole economy.
In normal functioning, as the proportion of bad loans — they are typically calculated as a percentage of the total advances (loans) — rise, two things happen. One, the concerned bank becomes less profitable because it has to use some of its profits from other loans to make up for the loss on the bad loans. Two, it becomes more risk-averse. In other words, its officials hesitate from extending loans to business ventures that may remotely appear risky for the fear of aggravating an already high level of non-performing assets (or NPAs).
From the taxpayer’s perspective, the most worrisome fact was that an overwhelming proportion of NPAs was with the public sector banks, which were owned by the government and hence by the Indian public. To keep such PSBs in business, the government was forced to recapitalise them — that is, use taxpayers’ money to improve the financial health of PSBs so that they could carry on with the business of lending and funding economic activity.
But with each passing year, NPAs continued to mount — not helped by the fact that the economy itself started to lose its growth momentum since the start of 2017.
It was argued by many that the government needs to create a bad bank — that is, an entity where all the bad loans from all the banks can be parked — thus, relieving the commercial banks of their “stressed assets” and allowing them to focus on resuming normal banking operations, especially lending.
While commercial banks resume lending, the so-called bad bank, or a bank of bad loans, would try to sell these “assets” in the market.
How will the NARCL-IDRCL work?
the remaining 85% will be in the form of “Security Receipts”. When the assets are sold , with the help
Will a bad bank resolve matters?
From the perspective of the government and the taxpayer, the situation is a little more muddled. After all, whether it is recapitalising PSBs laden with bad loans or giving guarantees for security receipts, the money is coming from the taxpayers’ pocket. While recapitalisation and such guarantees are often designated as “reforms”, they are band aids at best. The only sustainable solution is to improve the lending operation in PSBs.